In a typical corporate setting, a CEO
Introduction
For most of the jobs, there is a tenure during which an individual is most productive. There is a famous saying in the business world "A company is only as good as its leadership". In the corporate world, a CEO is appointed by the board of directors, who in turn is elected by the owners (shareholders) of the firm (see. Agrawal, A., & Knoeber, C. R. 1996), to render his services as the head of management team to steer the company towards its objective (which in most cases is implicitly assumed to be the shareholders wealth maximization SWM 1 ) by increasing the market price of outstanding shares, however a company can be registered for any legal objective 2 like customer satisfaction, profit maximization, generating employment, manufacture good quality products etc. not to mention SWM may be one of them. A CEO gets to utilize the resources (human and inanimate) of the company and has the decision making authority over them by the virtue of power vested to him by the owners of the company. He, in consultation with his executives is expected to make decisions in the best interest of the company, decisions that would send positive signals to the market, existing and potential investors about the future of the company.
There are incidences where CEOs did admitted that quitting was indeed a good idea after a certain time period because they virtually ran out of ideas and it was befitting in the interest of the firm and its stakeholders to appoint someone else as the new CEO rather than continuing with them. CEO tenure, unlike some public sector executive job does not have a pre-defined age of retirement. A CEO gets appointed and reappointed by the board based on his merits, which is the reason that there are examples of CEO tenures ranging from few months to close to 50 years. There is no gainsaying that, other factors like condition of the economy in general, political stability etc. to mention a few, inter alia firm performance may also drive the decision of reappointment of existing CEO or new appointment.
More amount of time does allow a CEO to get used to the dynamics of the company and act accordingly, but it might also accompany complacency to achieve newer targets. Can there be an optimal tenure for the CEOs which ceteris paribus would be just right for all stakeholders involved.
Motivation
The governance and management literature is replete with CEO leadership, background, style etc. but there lies a palpable void in the stream of CEO tenure and allied areas. The shortage of literature coupled by the fact that interesting variations in the tenure are available for the CEOs which ranges from a few days to almost 50 years 3 (Ryan Jr., H.E., Wang, L., Wiggins III, R.A. 2007). These voids warrants for a fresh perspective in this relatively less explored stream of knowledge. This paper would attract the attention of academia as well as representatives from corporate world equally. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) , states that the extent of power of negotiation (Bargaining power) between CEOs and boards of directors drives the composition and activities of the boards. In their model, the board of directors analyses the firm's performance and subsequently passes the judgement about the capability of the CEO. Based on that mandate, the board will decide whether to retain the CEO, investigate him further to obtain additional information about his capability, or to replace the CEO (Henderson, A., Miller, D., and Hambrick D. 2006).
Literature review and hypotheses formulation
With the assumption that the board retains the CEO, the board and the CEO will gradually negotiate to new levels of compensation, board scrutiny, perks, board composition etc. Talented CEOs are valuable to the board, so CEOs who perform and are retained will increase their bargaining power with the board. As a result of the continuous bargaining process, both the level of board monitoring and independence declines. Their model directly implies a negative relation between board-of-director monitoring and CEO tenure.
With the increase in performance of the company, the number of board meetings decline (Ryan et al 2007) as the board perceives the CEO to be well endowed with necessary capabilities. With the increase in tenure of the CEO, the number of board meetings decline, as reappointments increased the level of negotiation (bargaining power) Arthur, N. (2001) of the CEO.
When the CEO enjoys greater entrenchment, Berger et al. (1997) the board loses its tough decision making authority and director compensation exacerbates agency problems in these firms Agrawal, A., & Knoeber, C. (1996) elaborates on the agency conflicts. Managers have incentives to cause their firms to grow beyond the optimal size. Growth increases managerial power by increasing the resources under their control Jensen (1986) and Ryan & Wiggins (2004) . (Henderson et al. 2006 ) argues about the duration after which CEOs become obsolete and could not lead the company in the way he is supposed to do.
The first section of hypotheses is based on the premise that with the increase in the tenure of the CEO, followed by less scrutiny the Capital expenditure of the company would increase as the CEO embarks upon empire building 4 and takes on projects without proper economic justification because this means more managerial power, more resources at hand, more perks, more personal benefit (Hill, C.W., Phan, P. The increase in tenure brings more visibility and reputation to the CEO in the market, and he can wield his influence in important matters while in discussion with board.
Remuneration of the CEOs, is decided by the committee set up for this purpose. It analyses the performance and other relevant factors before finalizing the final pay and perquisites to the CEO. The amount of time spent serving the company is also one of the factors that determine the total pay. The second section of hypotheses is based on the premise that the remuneration of the CEO is proportional to the number of years served because the CEO would influence the remuneration committee with more and more entrenchment. (Bebchuk & Fried 2004 ) mentions that with increased tenure remuneration would be more stabilized and equity component would decrease.
2 a. H 0 : There is no change in the salary of the CEO with the increase in his tenure. H a : There is a change in the salary of the CEO with the increase in his tenure.
b. H 0 : There is no change in the bonus of the CEO with the increase in his tenure. H a : There is a change in the bonus of the CEO with the increase in his tenure.
c. H 0 : There is no change in the total compensation of the CEO with the increase in his tenure. H a : There is a change in the total compensation of the CEO with the increase in his tenure.
The CEO is expected to enhance the asset possession of the company in the long term as well as its ability to honor its obligations in short term. With that objective in mind, he would take steps and introduce policies that would help increase the current asset/ total asset of the firm.
The third section of hypotheses is based on the premise that with the passage of time and increase in the tenure of the CEO, he would have a better understanding of the business, market and economy as a whole that would enable him to take policy decisions which would result into a stronger company in terms of its asset holding.
3 a. H 0 : There is no change in the current asset of the firm with the increase in CEO tenure. H a : There is a change in the current asset of the firm with the increase in CEO tenure.
b. H 0 : There is no change in the total asset of the firm with the increase in CEO tenure. H a : There is a change in the total asset of the firm with the increase in CEO tenure.
c. H 0 : There is no change in the current asset/total asset of the firm with the increase in CEO tenure.
H a : There is a change in the current asset/total asset of the firm with the increase in CEO tenure.
The expansion or downsizing of the company's ownership is a decision which needs to be taken by CEO when the market is ready for it and it is in the interest of the company and its shareholders. A CEO makes these decisions and either sells or purchases common and preferred stock in the market.
The fourth set of hypotheses is based on the premise that CEOs would like to purchase more and more share from the market and downsize the ownership base so that there are less number of beneficiaries to share the profits with. An argument contrary to this would be that the CEOs would like to expand the ownership base to inordinately large scale and scatter the ownership as much as possible to reduce the likelihood of his turnover by a relatively concentrated group of owners. 4 a. H 0 : There is no change in the purchase of common and preferred share of the firm with the increase in CEO tenure. H a : There is a change in the purchase of common and preferred share the firm with the increase in CEO tenure.
b. H 0 : There is no change in the sale of common and preferred share of the firm with the increase in CEO tenure. H a : There is a change in the sale of common and preferred share the firm with the increase in CEO tenure.
Finally, the actions and decisions of a CEO boils down to measurable performances which could be objectively analyzed by stakeholders. Return on Asset (ROA) is a measure of firm's financial performance which has been used extensively in the finance literature. This article uses ROA, EPS and pretax income as measures of firm's financial performance with respect to CEOs tenure in the firm.
The fifth section of the hypotheses is based on the premise that with the increase in tenure the performance of a firm would increase under the efficient leadership of the CEO. 
Data and methodology
Data for the study has been extracted from several sources, of them COMPUSTAT's Execucomp database is the major one. Other than Execucomp, data from the annual reports of the company has also been taken and some other from those freely available on internet. The secondary data were collected from Annual reports of the companies, books, Journals, Magazines etc. The data represents the period from 1990-2013. The data from all the sources were collated and then cleaned to make it workable. A total of 12838 firm years were taken as sample for this study.
As far as the methodology utilized is concerned, an array of methodology ranging from simple "t" test for difference in mean to multiple regression analysis. Quantitative analysis has been used for the purpose of empirical analysis. The study mainly focused on the descriptive analysis, Multiple Regression Analysis, Independent sample t-test and Independent sample one-way ANOVA (F-test) as the underlying statistical test.
The Multiple Regression Analysis was used to find out the impact of CEO tenure on the financial health of a firm. The one-way ANOVA (F-test) and independent sample t-test were used to find out if there is a significant difference in firm performance with different CEO tenure.
Results

Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c and 1d
Result 1.a
It is quite evident from the above result 1.a. table generated by stata multivariate statistical analysis software, that both the independent variables (tenure of CEO and whether the CEO served as a member of board of directors) are not significant at 95 % confidence interval. However, if something has be taken out of this table it would be that the coefficients have a positive sign which at least indicates that there exists a positive correlation between the regressor and regressand i.e. with the increase in tenure, CAPEX would increase but not to a level where we could be certain of the result. So these results should be taken with a pinch of salt.
This establishes the null hypothesis number 1.a. that there is no discernible effect of the tenure of CEOs on the Capital expenditure of the firm.
The average tenure of CEOs turns out to be 6.6 years, with 2 years being the minimum and 20 years the maximum. Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 12588
. xtreg cashandshortterminvestments tenure1 executiveservedasadirectorduring, robust
When glanced through result 1.b. table, it displays that both the independent variables turns out to be significant at 95 % confidence interval. The direction of the coefficient tenure is opposite which is indicative of the fact that as the tenure of the CEO increases, he cuts down on short term investments. On the other hand if the CEO served as a member on the board of directors, then the coefficient is positive indicating that the cash and short term investments would get a boost in such a case where the CEO holds dual responsibility.
This refutes the null hypothesis number 1.b. that there is no discernable effect of the tenure of CEOs on the Capital expenditure of the firm.
Result 1.c
Result 1.c. exhibits that as far as property plant and equipment expenditure is concerned tenure does not have any significant role to play but if the executive served in the capacity of a board member in addition to that of a CEO then he plans for long run and invest in property plant and equipments a great deal.
The null hypothesis number 1.c. is validated that tenure does not impact property plants and equipments acquisition. 
Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c
Result 2.a
Going through result 2.a. shows that the salaries of CEOs are positively correlated with both tenure and his board membership. At 95 % confidence interval both the coefficients of the independent variables comes out to be positive and significant. Introduction of another dummy variable (Gender), however does not turn out to be significant.
The null hypothesis number 2.a. that tenure does not impact salary of CEOs gets rejected. Result 2.b. is similar to that of result 2.a. but more in intensity. Both the coefficients i.e. tenure and board membership of the CEO are significant at 95 % confidence interval and is larger in terms of magnitude when compared to result 2.a. which suggests that bonuses increase more rapidly as compared to that of salary with increase in tenure.
The null hypothesis number 2.b. that tenure does not impact bonus of CEOs gets rejected.
Result 2.c
Result 2.c. has a similar story to tell as that of result 2.a. and 2.b but with further increased magnitude as far as the coefficient of board membership of the company is concerned. Both coefficients turns out to be significant at 95 % confidence interval.
The null hypothesis number 2.c. gets refuted based on result 2.c. Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 12588
Hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c
. xtreg currentassetsothertotal tenure1 executiveservedasadirectorduring, robust
Result 3.a. demonstrates that tenure of an executive (CEO) has insignificant effect on the possession of current assets by a company. This is however true only at 5 % level of significance. The board membership of CEO has a positive coefficient to the tune of 69.52 mn dollars.
Null hypothesis number 3.a. gets accepted that tenure of CEO has no impact on the current asset holding of a company.
Result 3.b
The perusal of result 3.b. exhibits that tenure has a significant impact on total asset of a company. It goes to show that as the tenure of CEOs increase they take steps to accumulate more total assets for the company. The board membership of CEOs however does not have any bearing with the amount of total assets held by the company.
Null hypothesis number 3.b. gets rejected as tenure does have a positive significant on total asset of company. Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 12588
Result 3.c
. xtreg currentassettotalassetratio tenure1 executiveservedasadirectorduring, robust Result 3.c. displays that the ratio of current asset to total asset has no impact from tenure and has marginal positive coefficient if CEO is rendering his services as a member of the board too.
Null hypothesis number 3.c. gets accepted at 95 % confidence interval.
Hypotheses 4a and 4b
Result 4.a
Result 4.a. shows that board membership of CEOs does have a positive significant coefficient on the purchasing of common stock decision, whereas tenure does not influence it significantly.
Null hypothesis number 4.a. gets accepted at 95 % confidence interval. Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 12588
Result
. xtreg saleofcommonandpreferredstock tenure1 executiveservedasadirectorduring, robust
Surprisingly enough unlike purchase of common stocks where executive board membership has an impact and tenure doesn't have any, sale of common share is influenced negatively by tenure of CEO and not by his board membership.
Null hypothesis number 4.b. fails to get accepted at 5 % level of significance.
Hypotheses 5a
, 5b and 5c
Result 5.a
Result 5.a. manifests that return on assets (ROA), as measured as a ratio net income to total asset is influenced significantly by CEOs tenure. Although the coefficient is very small, but is significant at 95 % confidence interval.
Null hypothesis number 5.a. gets rejected at 95 % confidence interval.
Result 5.b
Earnings per share is affected significantly at 95 % level of confidence by the tenure of CEOs Null hypothesis number 5.b. gets rejected at 95 % confidence interval.
Result 5.c
Pretax income is taken as another measure of financial performance in addition to ROA and EPS. According to result 5.c. none of the independent variables but the constant is significant at 5 % level if significance.
Null hypothesis number 5.c gets rejected at 95 % confidence interval. Result 6.a. shows that both assumption of equal and unequal variances in the tenure of CEOs pre and post SOX exhibits that the tenure of CEOs post SOX has been reduced by 85 months which is a little more than 7 years.
Null hypothesis number 6.a. gets rejected at 95 % confidence interval.
Conclusions
The paper analyses the impact of CEO tenure on six different sections of variables.
First section is Policy decisions made by the CEO which comprises of capital expenditure undertaken by the CEO, Cash and short term investments, Property plant and equipments expenditure and Cash dividend outflow. In this section CEO tenure does not have any impact on Capex decisions whatsoever but his tenure and membership in the board both makes him impact the cash and short term investments. Property plant and equipments expenditure as well as cash dividend outflow is not impacted much by the tenure of CEO as much as it does if he has board membership too. All these policies like investing in cash and short term investments / investing in property plant and equipments and distributing dividends to the owners are pro shareholders measures and the CEO are taking these decisions when he is a member of the board and not otherwise. This could be a way to increase his visibility and spread a pro shareholder image across the market.
The second section is remuneration which is constituted of salary, bonus and total compensation. As expected all the three components are significantly impacted by CEO tenure as well as his board membership but what is notable here is that the bonus component of remuneration has a larger coefficient when compared to that of salary with increase in tenure which indicates that since salary is more or less well defined, the CEOs might influence the remuneration committee to earmark a larger chunk of bonus as part of total remuneration.
The third section is capacity to honor financial obligations which is composed of current asset, total asset and the ratio of current to total asset. Whereas current asset and ratio of current to total asset are significantly affected by the board membership of the CEO, total asset is impacted significantly by tenure of the CEO and not his board membership. This reflects that CEOs actually keep a long term plan at the back of their mind which is to increase the total assets of the company that results in increased revenue generation.
The fourth section is expansion/contraction of ownership base through sale and repurchase of common and preferred shares. This section has two components namely purchase of common and preferred shares and sale of common & preferred shares. The results obtained have a negative coefficient and is significant at 5 % level of significance which means that sale of common share reduces with each passing year of CEO in the company. Purchasing of shares however does not have any bearing with the tenure.
The fifth section is arguably the most important one as it concerns itself with the financial performance of the company. It comprises of return on assets, earning per share and pretax income. Tenure has significant impact on ROA and EPS both at 95 % confidence interval. The coefficient of tenure for ROA is small but so is the standard error, which makes the result interpretable. The biggest element of surprise in this section is the indifference of tenure on pretax income.
The sixth and final section addressed the claim that after the introduction of SOX the tenure of CEOs has plummeted in an affirmative manner. The t test used for difference of means indicates that there is a reduction of about 85 months in the tenure of CEO after 2002. It indicates that post 2002 following the financial scandals of Enron, World com etc. either board has become more prompt in taking turnover decisions or the investors have become myopic and want objective measurable results early. Either ways the CEOs tenure in a company on average has been trimmed down by about 7 years.
Limitations
The results may be limited by the temporal nature of the sample. Future studies dealing with CEO turnover should cover a longer period of CEO' tenure and examine the nature of performance and policy measures undertaken. Such a research design may provide additional insight over the matter at hand in this article regarding CEO tenure and various performance measures.
Short tenured CEOs:
 
